Corporal Preston Duncan Campbell
Reinforcements and the Conscription Crisis
After five months of intense fighting, the II Cdn Corps was starting to show some cracks. Two major issues required addressing: reinforcements for the infantry battalions and morale of the troops. Since the beginning of their fighting in Normandy in August until 5th November (97 days) only 8 days had been spent when the Algonquin Regiment was neither moving nor engaged in fighting. 77 of those days had been spent in action and the battalion had suffered 816 battle casualties. Major G.L. Cassidy wrote that “with the many others who had gone from the unit from illness and injuries, it was virtually a new battalion that faced the next period. {…} It was little wonder that we looked on one another almost as strangers.” (pp 201-2)
Terry Copp similarly notes the high casualty rates that 1st Canadian Army had suffered since they had commenced clearing the Scheldt estuary. He points out that “between 20 Sept and & 7 Nov, 6784 men had been wounded and 3244 reported killed or missing in action. An additional 949 had been treated for battle exhaustion, and 5008 had been evacuated to hospitals as sick. These losses – 14 percent of the total strength of the Canadian component of 21 Army Group – were heavily concentrated in the 21 Infantry Battalions.” (p. 177)
As the reinforcements from the home army started to supplement the weakened Divisions that had been fighting since D-Day, the infantry units complained of the quality of the reinforcements that were being sent to the front. Most of the men were reported as being poorly trained for their role. Copp states; "Many of the reinforcements joining infantry battalions in the autumn of 1944 were men who had enlisted and served in the artillery, Service Corps, or Signal Corps. All such replacements had undergone a conversion course to retrain as infantry, but a number of men were said to have reached front line units without adequate training. Battalion commanders protested this situation repeatedly..." (p. 178)
Of course, Preston Duncan Campbell was exactly the kind of reinforcement the battalion commanders were lamenting. Preston had initially served in the artillery corps in the Home Army, but in order to get overseas, he needed to retrain as infantry. There can be no doubt that Preston went into the fighting in Europe having received a fairly paltry infantry indoctrination. Unlike the battalions who had arrived in 1943 or early in 1944, who spent months training in England, men like Preston had conversion infantry training at the Canadian Army Basic Training Centres (CABTC) in Canada, shipped to England where they spent minimal time, then to the continent and on up to the front to join their units. His records indicate that he had no training on either the Bren (machine) gun or the P.I.A.T. (anti-tank rocket launcher); his records indicate there were no rounds available for PIAT training. Copp points out that the lack of training on the Bren and the PIAT was not uncommon.
Despite these complaints, there is evidence that - on the contrary - the system of reinforcements for the Canadian army was actually quite effective. Overall numbers across the three Divisions rose during September and October 1944 despite the heavy casualties taken during the fighting in the Breskens Pocket, South Beveland and North of Antwerp. Preston’s 4th Armoured Division reported being 872 men short in September, but by the time Operation SUITCASE began on 20 Oct, that number had reduced to 141. By the time SUITCASE was finished, however, their shortages were back up to 697 as of 4th November.
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The debate about reinforcements was inflamed by comments made on 18 September by Major Conn Smythe, the owner of the Toronto Maple Leafs, who had just returned from Europe and was recovering from injuries. From his bed in the Chorley Park Hospital, Smythe dictated a statement to The Globe and Mail newspaper, which printed it on its front page on September 19, 1944:
"The need for trained reinforcement in the Canadian Army is urgent.
During my time in France and in the hospitals of France and England, I was able to discuss the reinforcement situation with officers of units representing every section of Canada. I talked to officers from far Eastern Canada, French Canada, Ontario and all the Western Provinces. They agreed that the reinforcements received now are green, inexperienced and poorly trained. Besides this general statement, specific charges are that many have never thrown a grenade.
Practically all have little or no knowledge of the Bren gun and finally, most of them have never seen a Piat anti-tank gun, let alone fired one. These officers are unaniminous in stating that large numbers of unnecessary casualties result from this greenness, both to the rookies and to the other soldiers, who have the added task of trying to look after the newcomers as well as themselves.
I give these true facts of the reinforcement situation in the hope that:
Col Ralston, if he has other information, will know that his facts are out of date or that he has been misinformed;
The taxpayer will insist that no more money be spent on well-trained soldiers in this country except to send them to the battle fronts;
The people who voted these men should be used overseas when needeed should insist on the Government carrying out the will of the people; and
The relatives of the lads in the fighting zones should ensure no further casualties are caused to their own flesh and blood by the failure to send overseas reinforcements now available in large numbers in Canada.