Corporal Preston Duncan Campbell
Operation BLOCKBUSTER
A New Plan Emerges - 20-24 Feb 1945
By February 20th, the Canadian troops had managed to capture the Moyland Wood but had only a toe-hold on the Calcar Ridge to the southwest of the town of Calcar. Both were key obstacle to opening the main road towards Xanten and Wesel, where the last remaining bridge over the Rhine needed to be captured in tact in order to allow the Allies a speedy crossing of the Rhine. Nonetheless, Lt. General Simonds knew that to support the amount of vehicles and other equipment that would be needed to sustain the battle, he would need additional roads southeast towards Xanten. The only other main road through this part of the Rhineland that could provide the necessary vehicle capacity lay within Lt. General Horrocks' sector where his XXX British Corps was fighting to move southeast to Xanten as well on the right flank of the Canadians. That road would be needed for their movements. The only other option was a rail line that traversed the Hochwald Forest, a formidable defensive obstacle between the Calcar Ridge and Xanten itself. It was heavily defended and would be extremely difficult to overcome, but if it could be captured, then the rail line could be replaced by a newly built road in order to sustain the II Canadian Corps advance.
The basic plan for BLOCKBUSTER, as explained by General Harry Crerar (GoC 1st Canadian Army) to his Corps commanders (Simonds and Horrocks) on 21 Feb was as follows:
“He told 30th Corps to renew its advance the next day, capturing the town of Weeze; if the opportunity arose it was then to exploit towards Kevelaer. Four British divisions and 1st Commando Brigade were to take part in the advance. The 2nd Canadian Corps, with two British divisions under command, was to begin a new offensive on 26 Feb, breaking through the Hochwald defences and exploiting to Xanten. […] Crerar had placed both 4th Canadian Armoured Division and 11th British Armoured Division under Simonds, and it seems that these added resources tempted him to ignore the problems encountered by armoured vehicles in the first weeks of the battle. He proposed to use his infantry divisions to seize the [...] defences around Udem before sending 4th Canadian Armoured Division through the Hochwald gap towards Xanten.” Copp p. 227-8.
Copp describes the plan for Blockbuster as typical of many operations undertaken by II Corps:
“…imaginative and complex, with little allowance for error or the inevitable friction of war.”
BLOCKBUSTER and the campaign for the Rhinelands
Once Crerar and his Corps commanders, Horrocks and Simonds, had issued necessary orders, the preparations for the new offensive began. The situation for 1st Canadian Army at the beginning of BLOCKBUSTER appeared promising. 3rd Canadian Division was in Moyland on the extreme left. The line then went southwest to Goch, occupied by 2nd Canadian Division and the whole of Lt. General Horrocks' XXX Corps. Against them, 1st Canadian Army faced eleven Divisions of the German 1st Parachute Army under General Schlemm. Farther south, the US 9th Army, previously prevented from advancing when the Germans deliberately opened the Roer River dams, had finally burst across the Roer River on the 23rd and General Simpson was rapidly moving north, converging on the Xanten sector where they would join 1st Canadian Army in crossing the Rhine. In front of him stood only a relatively weak German 15th Army under General Von Zangen; most of the German forces had been moved north to reinforce Schlemm's 1st Parachute Army against 1st Canadian Army while the US 9th Army remained out of the battle, unable to advance across the flooded Roer.
Some debate still exists, however, about what the 1st Canadian Army should have done given the tremendous success the US 9th Army was having in the south of the Rhineland. Montgomery, Crerar, and Simonds have been criticised for the BLOCKBUSTER plan as it deliberately attacked the enemy’s strongest position (Calcar Ridge and Hochwald Gap) rather than outflanking and manoeuvering around the main defensive strength of the German forces by Horrocks' XXX Corps. The Official Historian for the Canadians, Stacey, nonetheless defends Crerar’s thinking: XXX Corps was encountering stiff resistance around Weeze, and more importantly, the tempo of BLOCKBUSTER required a good supply route. Neither the north or south roads were thought to be adequate, but capturing the Hochwald gap would allow the use of the railway line. Moreover, Cassidy believes the situation was ripe for offensive action and exploitation by the Canadians. He states; “Clearly it was necessary to exploit this situation by another blow in the Canadian sector, so that the reeling enemy could not detach and regroup his forces to meet the American threat. Intentional or not, the American delayed offensive now offered wider possibilities than perhaps had first been envisioned.” (Warpath P. 249) In the mind of Stacey, and certainly in the mind of Simonds, Horrocks and Crerar at the time, the stage had been set for the 1st Canadian Army to make the crucial breakthrough.
Terry Copp, on the other hand, writing decades later believes that Crerar, Simonds and Horrocks should have simply held their ground firmly, allowing the American advance from the south to operate as the main effort against the weaker force of 15th Army under German General Von Zangen. He argues that by simply holding their ground, the Canadians would have pre-occupied the larger of the two groups of Germans, preventing the two main components from combining forces, which in turn would have allowed the US 9th Army an easy run to Xanten and Wesel, while reducing the casualties taken by the Canadians. In his mind, the 1st Canadian Army should have formed an anvil in the north against which the American hammer, advancing rapidly from the south, could have crushed the Germans quickly. But this scenario was not allowed to eventuate. “Instead, frontal attacks on the main German defensive position were ordered, and II Cdn Corps found itself fighting one of its costliest operations of the war.” P. 226.
The Plan for BLOCKBUSTER
...and the role assigned to the Algonquin Regiment
Preston and The Algonquin Regiment were at this time in Boxtel well behind the front “…hurriedly grooming men, weapons and equipment for a new, all-out effort. On the 22nd, after a flurry of last-minute inoculations, repairs and documentation, a freshened force, high in morale, set out on what was to be, in retrospect, its climactic adventure.” (Cassidy P. 247) That night the Algonquins passed through the wrecked remnants of the Reichswald forest which had been devastated by the earlier fighting during Operation VERITABLE, and onward to the rolling, hilly farmland beyond. Near the village of Hau, they would concentrate and wait for the next four days for their turn to re-enter the fighting.
ON the 25th of February, the Algonquins were briefed on their task for the upcoming battle by the Intelligence Officer Lt Caron, and his opposite number from the South Alberta Tank Regiment. The troops were made to view and study the sand-table model that the Intelligence Officers had prepared. Cassidy says this was the best briefing the regiment had received in the war, and was necessary due to the complexity of the coming battle. “…the operation to come was a complex one, wherein many events and times had to dovetail if success was to be assured.” (P. 249)
The operation was to take place in four phases:
Phase 1 – 2nd Canadian Division supported by 2 x tank regiments of 2nd Canadian Armoured Brigade would bypass Calcar and aim to secure the high ground to the southwest - The Calcar Ridge.
Phase 2 – 3rd Canadian Division would attack from the right flank towards Keppeln. Both phase 1 and 2 were essentially preliminary actions for the main effort in Phases 3 and 4.
Phase 3 – Was to begin once Phase 1 and 2 objectives had been confirmed secure. 3rd Canadian Division would then attack towards Udem while the majority of 4th Armoured Division, known as 'Tiger Force' seized the high ground Northwest of Udem at the southern extremity of the Calcar Ridge.
Phase 4 – The remaining elements of 4th Canadian Armoured Division, known as 'Lion Force', including Preston's Algonquin Regiment and the South Alberta Tank Regiment would attack across the open valley between the Calcar ridge and the Hochwald Gap securing positions in the gap. Meanwhile 11th British Armoured Division fighting under the control of Simonds' II Canadian Corps would sweep the area south of the Hochwald Forest and lead a flanking assault against Sonsbeck.
The main effort of this operation involved Preston and the Algonquin Regiment attacking the heavily defended Hochwald Gap across an open valley where they would be highly visible and lacking any form of cover. It was a plan that accepted high risk, and would likely lead to high casualties. Nonetheless, the potential benefits of opening a secure route to Xanten meant that, at least in the eyes of the 1st Canadian Army leadership, the risks were worth the potential reward.
BLOCKBUSTER Begins
26 Feb 1945
Despite weather turning foul, meaning that BLOCKBUSTER would not get the full support of aircraft that was planned, the operation commenced at 0330 on 26 Feb 1945. Phase I (2nd Cdn Division attack on the northern end of Calcar Ridge) and Phase II (3rd Cdn Division attack on the village of Keppeln and the town of Udem) had gone off smoothly despite heavy resistance. Phase III was then commenced with 'Tiger' Force comprising the bulk of the heavy firepower of 4th Armoured Division leaving the start line around 0900 on the 26th. Phase III went well and by that eveining, Tiger Force had captured most of its planned objectives on time. “
Despite heavy casualties (26 February would turn out to be one of the costliest days of the war for the Canadians), the first twenty-four hours of Blockbuster had been a series of successful engagements that resulted in the attainment of all objectives.” Copp p. 235.
Lt Gen Simonds, the Canadian Corps Commander, and Maj-Gen Vokes, Commander 4th Cdn Armoured Division, believed that despite heavy resistance to this point, conditions were ripe for the final action of BLOCKBUSTER. Phase IV involving 'Lion Force' which comprised Preston and the Algonquins, were therefore ordered to commence their attack down the slope of the Calcar ridge, across the open countryside and then into the Hochwald Gap itself - all under the cover of darkness.
By this time (midnight of the 26th of Feb) the Algonquins and the rest of ‘Lion’ force had concentrated at a point 3000 yards north of Keppeln. It was described as a dark rainy night with an icy wind. There were long traffic jams and confusion about where the 1st wave of troops had gotten to. The Commanding Officer of the Algonquins, LCOL Bradburn, sent the Company commanders forward to find their own routes but in the stormy dark conditions they got lost and at HQ LCOL Bradburn had some anxious times thinking their H hour would have to be delayed. The Commander of 'Lion' Force, Brigadier Jefferson (normally Commander of 10th Infantry Brigade) sent urgent orders for the Battalion to cross the valley and secure the objective at first light come what may.
BLOCKBUSTER Controversy
Copp argues that the relative success of the first phases of Blockbuster encouraged all of the commanders to press on despite the wet ground and continuing rain, and, most importantly, he appears to believe that 'Lion' force was undersized for the task both in terms of infantry battalions and supporting armour. “The decision to employ the infantry brigade of an armoured division in a slugging match
at this stage in the war made little sense, but Simonds, Crerar, and Montgomery were determined to press on.[…] The decision to send a small battlegroup forward in these circumstances reflected Vokes’s gung-ho approach to combat [...]' Copp P. 236.
Yet Major Cassidy of the Algonquins makes no mention of any feeling that their force was undersized. Quite the contrary.
'The fourth phase (of BLOCKBUSTER) was the one which concerned our battalion. The Tenth Infantry Brigade Group, to consist at this time solely of ourselves and the South Albertas (Armoured Recce regiment) plus support weapons, was to strike boldly across the broad valley fronting the Hochwald, and establish itself in the gap between the Hochwald and the Balbergerwald, insuring posession of the railway line there. [...] Lion Group [...] was initially composed of 29 Canadian Armoured Recce Regiment (the South Albertas) , the Algonquin Regiment, the 10 Canadian Independent Machine Gun Company (New Brunswick Rangers) and one battery of the 5th Anti-tank Regiment. In addition, this group would have in support one squadron of Flail tanks ("Scorpions"), one squadron of "AVREs" (engineer bombard tanks) and one squadron of "Crocodile" flame-throwing tanks. [...] This latter group, while relatively small in numbers, packed quite a wallop in fire power and mobility, and would doubtless come as an unpleasant surprise to an exhausted enemy battered by so much preceding power." (Cassidy p. 250-10).
If there was any concern for the numerical size and punching power of Lion Force, it may be a product of hindsight; it does not appear to have been a concern of the Commanders at the time. What was concerning them was the weather, the traffic congestion, the confusion and the lack of clarity about the completion of other pre-cursor operations before Phase IV was to begin.
Copp highlights that the plan for Lion force’s attack was predicated on conditions being set by the flanking formation to their South, 11th Armd Div, that had yet to occur, as 11th Div had been stalled by heavy resistance and poor weather. Under these exceptionally adverse conditions, LT Col Bradburn hesitated to commence the attack. “The rain, mud, and growing confusion … had prevented some of his sub-units, including an entire company, from arriving at the forming-up place, so he tried to postpone the attack.” But the direct order from Jefferson left him no choice but to step off on time at 0430.
The Algonquin Regiment was about to step into its toughest test yet.
'Lion' Force Attacks the Hochwald Gap
0430 hrs - 27 Feb 1945
Despite the confusion and disruption, once the order to move was received, 'Lion' Force got moving with the infantry catching a lift on the trucks and tanks but the mud continued to render progress very slow. Scattered rear-guard resistance was encountered and more than 300 prisoners had been taken before 'Lion' Force had even reached Kirsel and the start line for their phase of the operation. Further delays were encountered waiting for A and D Companies, who had managed to get lost moving through the dark early morning hours.
When they finally stepped off, A and B companies attacked in parallel to secure road junctions in front of the Hochwald Gap, then Preston’s C company would attack through the middle and into the gap itself. D coy would come through last and push through C coy further into the gap. (See Map Sketch 38 taken from Col. Stacey's Official History)
A squadron of tanks from the South Alberta Regiment and the Carrier platoon from the Algonquins would perform a ‘right hook’ passing south of the railway embankment through a tunnel and then proceed along the southern side of the embankment, aiming to secure the Balbergerwald and meet up with the forward C and D companys in the gap. The story of the Hochwald is best relayed by describing the events that occurred for each part of 'Lion' force.
'A' company Algonquin Regiment – at this point this unit was only a small force of 2 x platoons and two supporting tanks. They encountered very little resistance from confused German troops. By the time it was full light they were on their objective.
'B' company – On the northern flank, these soldiers met some concentrated small arms fire after coming over the first crest, but quickly dealt with and bypassed this pocket of resistance. Later, a hidden Panther tank opened fire on them from the rear, but did no damage. The only thing its fire achieved was to give away its position. Shortly afterwards it was destroyed by a supporting South Alberta tank. Wire fences were the next obstacle which slowed the advance and provided opportunity for a few German machine gun positions to the left and front to pin them down until supporting tanks again relieved the pressure. From here B company was able to move forward onto their objective – prepared trenches of the Siegfried line.
'C' company – This was Preston's company and it is fair to say they had been given a more risky task than A or B companies. C company were meant to wait until A and B companies had attained their objectives before moving, but decided to move out early because of heavy artillery fire coming down into Kirsel, the jumping off point. Major C.B. Robertson had them quickly following on the heels of A and B companies. Many German prisoners were taken as they simply got up out of their slit trenches and surrendered…even after the company had passed them, they preferred to join the line of prisoners heading west to Canadian Headquarters lines, rather than resist. By 8 am they had passed through the two lead companies and had consolidated on their position in the 2nd line of Siegfried line prepared trenches.
While this first phase had all gone well, 2nd Division, who were meant to be on the left flank of this battle group of Algonquins and South Albertas, had not yet gotten into position. On the right flank, where 3rd Canadian Division and British 11th Armoured Divisions were meant to be providing cover, the story was the same. They had not yet achieved their positions. These supporting units had been slowed and held up by stiff resistance. This created a situation where the 3 x Algonquin companies and their supporting South Alberta tanks making up Lion group were out in front of their support and in a vulnerable position to be counterattacked. Moreover, the ‘right hook’ force was nearly wiped out by an ambush after passing under the railway embankment tunnel.
“…a withering rain of 88mm fire struck with savage intensity. The lead tanks, hit first, blazed up and slewed across the road and into ditches, blocking the possibility of further advance or deployment to defensive fire positions. From both sides, south-east and north-east, the enemy pumped the screaming shells into the bogged-down column. Tank crews and carrier crews, helpless to do anything but get out of the metal coffins, took to the ditches, and watched the enemy methodically batter every vehicle into uselessness. Nearby enemy infantry added ‘bazooka’ fire to the horror, and within the brief space of half an hour, every tank and every carrier but one had been put out of action. In all, nine tanks and twelve carriers were lost.” Cassidy p 259-260
For the rest of Lion group situated in the Hochwald gap, the loss of the right hook force meant that the Germans still had a strong position from which to base their attacks in the Balbergerwald. If the right hook force had made it through, they would have made the position of the Germans in the Balbergerwald untenable, forcing a retreat. For the men in the gap, they now had to dig in and hang on while Battalion headquarters sought to reinforce them.
From 10am, the enemy began to understand the magnitude of the threat posed by 'Lion' group, and began to concentrate artillery fire into the Gap including heavy mortars and heavy caliber artillery from North of the Rhine coming in from a flanking position. “This […] proved to be one of the most disconcerting things about the fight for the gap. One expected fire to come from the front, or even from a flank, but when it came in over one’s left shoulder, it was unsettling, to say the least.” Cassidy P. 260
Preston and the rest of the Algonquins, and their mates from the South Alberta Regiment, were in a terrible pickle.
The Hochwald Gap (Continued)
Terry Copp, in his book 'Cinderella Army' is critical of the continued decision making by the Brigade, Division and Corps commanders throughout the day on February 27th. Lt Col Bradburn had apparently informed Brigadier Jefferson that he was unable to continue as neither tanks nor infantry could advance against the intense fire in the valley in front of the Hochwald forest. Simonds, Vokes and Jefferson all met at 4th Div HQ shortly before noon, and despite the Algonquins being held up in the Gap, the lack of progress by 11th Division on the south flank, and similarly by 5th Brigade (2nd Cdn Div) on the north flank, they decided to continue to advance using all possible resources.
Later at 1600, Simonds met with Crerar and Horrocks at the Army Commander’s Daily Conference. It was known that 9th Army had two divisions across the Roer and that German resistance in the South was crumbling, and so, Copp argues, the combination of all these factors would suggest that the prudent move at this point would be to hold and consolidate the territory west of Hochwald-Udem, while the US 9th Army rampaged north towards Xanten. Instead, the decision was taken to mount a new effort to break through the Gap. Simonds issued new orders that evening, but in the meantime, 'Lion' force had to endure what must have been an extremely long and arduous day pinned down under heavy fire from all directions.
It was not until after dark that 'D' company and additional tanks were finally able to be moved into the Gap, improving the Battalion's position. By noon on the 28th, The remaining infantry battalions of 10th Infantry Brigade, The Argylls and the Lincoln and Wellands, were also pushed forward; they moved slowly in the light of day under heavy artillery fire, but eventually were in place with the aim of a renewed assault to push up into the Gap. Just as the attack was about to step off, however, a massive enemy artillery barrage directly on their start positions resulted in many casualties and the attack never developed.
“Just as they were completely formed up, ready to assault, both units came under the crushing weight of the heaviest enemy artillery and mortar concentration that any of us had seen on the Continent so far.” Cassidy P. 261 Copp indicates this occurred just after midday (p. 238). Either way, a new plan would have to be formed. Or perhaps, now was the time to cut their losses? Not with ol' 'Blood & Guts' Vokes in command! Copp laments the remorselessness of the determination from Simonds and Vokes:
“Despite overwhelming evidence of failure, Vokes ordered 10th Brigade to hold its ground and arranged a new effort by squadrons of the British Columbia Regiment and Grenadier Guards. Enemy guns soon put a stop to this attempt, and arrangements were made to relieve the battered units of the 4th Division, which were finally to be withdrawn for a brief rest.” Copp p. 239. They say the definition of insanity is repeating the same actions and expecting a different result. Thus, Vokes sent three separate waves of tanks and infantry to attack the Gap, and while the Algonquins were able to get in under the cover of darkness, both attempts to support them during daylight on the 28th of February were halted with concentrated artillery fire before the reinforcements had event stepped off. 2nd Division was now to take over the effort to breach the Gap.
Importantly, on the 28th, 11th armoured Division finished clearing Udem to the South and were pressing forward to put pressure on the enemy’s Balbergerwald position, while 2nd Cdn Division had made it into the northern woodland areas of the Hochwald. “The pressure was therefore becoming more uniform on the enemy’s defences.” P. 263. As these flanking formations eventually caught up to 4th Canadian Armoured Division's advance, the threat of encirclement (both from these other British and Canadian forces, and also from the US 9th Army approaching from the south) forced the German Commander to commence withdrawing his strongest formations from the Hochwald Gap and commence preparations for the final defence of the Xanten bridgehead. This had the effect of easing somewhat the pressure on the Hochwald Gap and on the 1st of March, The Algonquins were were able to extricate themselves after spending nearly two days pinned down and unable to move. They spent that night near Udem and were able to get a hot meal and some sleep, but it was to be only a short reprieve. They were re-committed to the Gap the following day.
The Algonquins would this time team up with remaining tanks from the Grenadier Guards and the Lake Superior Regiment in an effort to make one final push through the Hochwald Gap. Again, however, the initial attack was late starting due to coordination problems getting all the vehicles in place, and because they started at 0500 rather than the planned 0200, they lost the benefit of traversing the open ground at night under cover of darkness. The lead formations eventually ran into a pair of Tiger tanks that, because they completely outmatched the Canadian Sherman tanks in firepower and armour strengh, were able to hold up the advance. Maj-Gen Vokes then decided to push the remaining companies of the Algonquins into the Gap in support, but these troops came under heavy fire again from either side of the railroad track and took heavy losses. (Copp, p. 241) Major Robertson and 'C' Company found themselves pinned down again in the Gap, under fire from both left and right. Their lead platoon was 'cut to ribbons' and they had to sit tight for another day until after dark they were able to retreat once again. 'D' company had earlier been surrounded and overrun by the enemy. Finally later that night, companies from the Black Watch attached to 2nd Division were able to meet up and relieve the Algonquins in the Gap, having finally cleared the Hochwald forest to their North. It was by now the 3rd of March, and the Algonquins had been fighting to take the Hochwald Gap for 5 days with only a short reprieve of a few hours on the 1st of March. They were now rotated out of the line for 3 days of rest and recuperation.
FIghting would go on until the 4th of March when finally, General Schlemm's forces retreated out of the Gap and the Canadians finally pushed through.
The Battle for the Hochwald Gap against the German 1st Parachute Army was easily the most intense fighting that the Algonquin Regiment had undergone since their time in Normandy, and for Corporal Preston Duncan Campbell, who had missed the fighting in France, it was undoubtedly the most severe fighting he had seen. Operation VERITABLE / BLOCKBUSTER had intended to destroy all German forces West of the Rhine in 3-4 days and capture the Wesel bridgehead in the process. The tough determined defence of General Schlemm's 1st Parachute Army against overwhleming odds extneded the campaign to 31 days with 1st Canadian Army achieving an advance of only 2km per day on average. The enemy was not yet beaten. And for Preston, his War was about to come to an end at the very climax of the Rhineland Battle.
The two videos at the links below explain Operation BLOCKBUSTER superbly and better than I could ever achieve in a few hundred words. If you really want to understand what Preston and his colleagues went through, then please watch these videos.