Corporal Preston Duncan Campbell
Operation VERITABLE
Following the defeat of the Ardennes offensive on 7th January 1945, Field Marshall Montgomery gave a press conference in which he outlined his own role in defeating the German thrusts, deepening divisions between the US and British Army Commanders. Making matters worse was the ongoing debate between the Allied commanders about the next step, to advance into Germany from the Northern (British/Canadian) positions, or from the South (US). Eventually, Eisenhower decided on the Northern route, but he refused to commence until all remaining Germans had been pushed back over the Rhine and the western bank of the river was entirely in Allied hands in order to ensure defensively firm positions. Eisenhower's vision was that simultaneous attacks from the North (Operation VERITABLE) and south (Operation GRENADE) were to begin on 8 and 10 Feb respectively. As it turned out, however, GRENADE was delayed by two weeks due to Germans opening the dykes and flooding the Roer valley, effectively blocking the US 9th Army under General Simpson from advancing on schedule. VERITABLE would therefore end up confronting the entirety of the German army presence remaining in the Rhineland.
The Siegfried Line defences were the first obstacle that 1st Canadian Army would need to overcome during VERITABLE. Terry Copp describes the fortifications behind which the German soldiers sheltered. “Thee defensive belts confronted the Allies, each from 500 to 1000 metres wide. The first, on the edge of the Reichswald Forest, covered the ten-kilometre gap between the Maas and the town of Wyler. North of Wyler the flood plain of the Rhine, covered in several feet of water from the blown dykes, provided another kind of obstacle. Through the heart of the Reichswald and south along the Maas, the Siegfried line itself presented a position that might cause trouble if not quickly breached. A third belt stretched from the Rhine near Rees to Geldern. The extensive ‘squares’ of forest that made up the Rechswald were an obstacle in their own right, but perhaps the greatest asset the Germans possessed was the weather. When Montgomery first outlined Veritable he had expressed the hope that ‘dry or hard ground’ would be available. ‘If these conditions exist,’ he told his commanders, ‘then the basis of the operations will be speed and violence. The aim will be to pass armoured columns through to disrupt and disorganise enemy resistance in the rear.’ But, he cautioned, ‘if the ground is wet and muddy, then a slower and more methodical progress may be forced upon us.’ By February the ground was very wet and very muddy. Rain and grey skies covered the battlefield, keeping air operations to a minimum and promising slow progress.’”
In the official history, Stacey highlights the two main factors that meant VERITABLE inevitably bogged down: the weather, which made the roads impassable (and similarly prevented the aggressive use of air support) and the destruction of the Roer dams, thereby flooding that valley and preventing the concurrent breakout of US 9th Army into the Rhineland. One half of the operation was therefore prevented, allowing the German commander of the western front, Von Rundstedt, and his subordinate commander, Schlemm, to concentrate what remained of their forces in the Nijmegen sector against 1st Cdn Army. “Veritable settled down into a slogging match for the key points of Calcar and Goch, possession of which could provide a springboard for another, and later, action under regrouped forces. Planning for this second major operation, soon to be known as ‘Blockbuster’ began at once, It was to be largely the task of Second Canadian Corps, under Lt.-Gen G.G. Simonds, and would strike out on the left flank once the springboard had been secured.” p. 247
Similarly, Terry Copp points out that "...within forty-eight hours of launching the attack it was clear that the ground was so soggy from the thaw and the deliberate flooding that there would be no breakout of the armoured units. By the afternoon of 12 February Horrocks had been informed that the American attack would have to be delayed for at least another week because the Roer was impassable.” P. 212
Had this offensive began in the first week of January, as they had initially been planned, the frozen ground would have offered much better ground for vehicles meaning the Allies could harness one of their key advantages over the Germans; their mobility. But the delay caused by the need to counter and then reverse the German Ardennes Offensive meant that the attack was a fully month later getting under way. Mobility was lost in the flooded fields and forests of the Rhineland.
It is important to point out that while the 2nd and 3rd Canadian infantry Divisions were fighting under Horrocks’ XXX Corps, the main effort of VERITABLE was a British effort involving British units. So while technically this was a 1st Cdn Army operation, it was almost entirely controlled at the Corps level by Horrocks. Crerar didn’t seem fussed by this however, and Terry Copp highlights that Horrocks and Crerar established a good relationship. Lt General Simonds was by this point being completely left out, technically still commanding II Cdn Corps, which had only 1 x division (4th Armoured) remaining.
2nd Division had a very limited objective in the first couple of days of VERITABLE, liberating a small town and retiring into Corps reserve. 3rd Division had a more enduring, but less enviable task of clearing the flooded plains to the north of the Cleve- Nijmegen highway, protecting the Corps left flank. “During the week before 8 February a thaw had softened the Rhine flood plain, and enemy action to create breaks in two major dykes added to a flood of water that gradually submerged the battlefield the Canadians were supposed to manoeuvre over. The 79th Armoured Division was called on the supply Buffaloes, and the Canadians were reintroduced to the amphibious vehicles that had been so valuable during the Scheldt operations.” Copp p. 209.
Fortunately, the forces guarding the Siegfried line defences at the beginning of VERITABLE was the much depleted German 84th infantry Division. The feint attack launched a few weeks earlier in the north of the Nijmegen sector (Operation ELEPHANT) had been costly in Canadian lives, but had succeeded in convincing the German commanders that the Allied attack would aim to push north across the Rhine into Germany. This had the effect of initially delaying any reinforcements being sent to support 84th Division but from 10 February, two days into the attack, the German commanders overcame their initial confusion and reassigned the experienced 47th Panzer Corps comprising 116th Panzer Division and 15th Panzer Grenadier Division to support Schlemm’s 1st Parachute Army.
Moyland Wood
The two Canadian Divisions participating in VERITABLE faced difficult challenges. After securing the left flank by clearing isolated pockets of resistance in the flooded zone, 3rd Division was brought south of the highway to the high ground to replace the 15th Scottish Division who had been meant to proceed all the way to Calcar during this phase, but whom had run out of steam trying to clear Moyland Wood of the troops of 116th Panzer Division (part of 64th Panzer Corps).
While 7th Brigade was fighting well-entrenched and disciplined troops in Moyland Wood, Cabeldu’s 4th Brigade of 2nd Division was fighting towards the Goch-Calcar road. After initial success pushing back elements of two parachute battalions, Sclemm counter-attacked immediately, at night, with Panzer Lehr Division. By the following morning, this counter-attack had failed and been beaten further back. Copp identifies this as a good example of how Anglo-Canadian ‘bite-and-hold’ tactics had been developed to withstand immediate German counter-attacks. P. 218-220
“The Canadians, employing their by now standard procedure, used an elaborate fire plan – including smoke, a rolling barrage, and a carefully planned counter-battery program – to allow tanks and Kangaroo-borne infantry to reach limited objectives, dig in and repel the initial German counter-attacks.” Copp P. 219
Nonethelss, by this point the initiative of the first couple of days of Veritable had been lost, and the Allies recognised the need to regroup for a second offensive push. This next phase would come to be known as Operation BLOCKBUSTER and would finally see the Canadians clear the Rhineland and cross over that great river into the German heartland.