Corporal Preston Duncan Campbell
Veen & Groesbeek
Corporal PD Campbell's War Ends
Between the 3-6 March, the Algonquins had some time to recuperate, and an influx of new recruits, mainly conscripts from the Home Army, refilled the ranks of the Battalion. By the time the Algonquins were re-committed to the fighting a few days later, the German bridgehead on the western side of the Rhine had been shrunken further. The Hochwald had been cleared, and the town of Sonsbeck had been captured by 10th Infantry Brigade. This was normally the Algonquins' brigade, but having been so badly decimated in the Hochwald, they were left out of the fighting for Sonsbeck. Now, 1st Canadian Army was closing the circle around the town of Xanten, where the last bridge over the Rhine was the only escape route for the remaining German formations.
A number of small villages lay on the outskirts of Xanten, however, which had been heavily fortified by the Germans in their fighting withdrawal from the Rhineland. One of these was Veen where 10th Brigade was to conduct a two-battalion attack. The Algonquins, with 'A' Squadron of the South Alberta Regiment in support. and The Lincoln & Welland Regiment would lead the attack on Veen.
The road from Sonsbeck to Veen was to be the axis for the attack – Algonquins would attack on the left (north) side of the road, L&Ws on the right (south). The attack had a high level of risk about it, even though the Germans were collapsing their lines and hoping to secure their retreat across the Rhine.
“Reconnaissance revealed that both our start line and the entire way to the objectives was completely without cover, and that the enemy had full and clear observation of the entire area. To counter this, the artillery and mortar support programme was to contain a good deal of smoke. But the fact that one lone reconnaissance officer was fired on by a gun three or four thousand yards away was a good indication that the German was very alert to his danger in this area, and would have the entire place taped for defensive fire tasks.” Cassidy p. 279
The Attack into Veen
1600 Hrs - 7 Mar 1945
The attack plan was relatively simple:
Phase 1 - 'A' company would lead off taking a crossroads and some buildings on the right hand side of the front, stopping short a few hundred yards from Veen.
Phase 2 - 'B' coy would do a similar job, but take up position on the left of the front.
Phase 3 - Preston’s 'C' company under Command of Major Robertson would then become the main attacking force, advancing through the base of fire established by 'A' and 'B' companies, and attack into the NW of Veen itself.
There were plenty of land mines, flooding and other obstacles when you got off the roads very far; in other words, the Germans had prepared this ground very well for a very strong defense of what was a critical position in their ability to defend Xanten and Wesel. It would funnel the Canadian troops directly into areas that had been pre-sighting by machine guns, mortar fire and artillery. The ground was open and without cover….the Germans would see them coming and have time to respond with overwhelming prepared defensive fire. This had the making of a very bad day.
Phase 1. 'A' coy attack commenced at 4pm in the afternoon and heavy fire was received almost immediately and took a heavy toll. Nonetheless the company pressed on and captured their objective under heavy fire but by the time this crossroads had been taken, the company had only 25 men left. The author gives a description of the situation. “During the fierce battle here, in which the force was laced repeatedly by heavy machine gun fire, nine prisoners were taken. After a brief reorganisation, no. 8 Platoon, consisting of eight men only, attempted to take the fist house in the group assigned as the next objective. They lost three more men, and were forced back to the cross-roads area. A troop of four South Alberta tanks lost all but one on the way in. The fourth tank found a sheltered spot between two houses, but the crew commander discovered later that he could not move his tank a foot either way without being fired at by an 88mm gun.” (Cassidy P. 280). 'A' company consolidated in the cross-roads area for the night and got their casualties out while 18 reinforcements joined them in the lines.
Phase 2. 'B' company started at the same time as A company and came under attack immediately by the same fire that hit 'A' company. Their task was to take a group of buildings, a slightly hairier task, and they came under significantly more small arms fire. The two lead platoons (11 and 12 Platoons) were shot up very badly and failed to reach their objective initially, leaving only 18 men able to fight between them. The remaining platoon, advancing on the left fared better and then organised two sections to attempt to seize the initiatives that the two leading platoons had been unable to secure. The attack was successful, but costly. Only 3 men remained on completion, but the enemy had been completely wiped out.
The Algonquin Regiment War Diary for the 7th of March said the following:
At 1730 hrs “A” and “B” Coys were on their objectives, less certain enemy strong points within their areas and though by this time casualties were well over 50%, the positions were firm and each supported by tanks but there was very little offensive power left in either coy.
Phase 3. 'C' company, Preston’s company, was now launched into the fray, with the intent of clearing up 'B' company's objectives, then moving on into Veen itself. They too came under heavy small arms fire. “Snipers seemed to be everywhere. Lieut. G.C. Mowry, commanding 13 Platoon, was killed outright, and after many other casualties, both 13 and 15 platoons ended up dug in south of ‘B’ company. The two platoons were now commanded by Cpl. Hockenstein, who later was killed himself. […] A quick attack on the stronghold that had held up ‘B’ company failed again, and more casualties were incurred. The situation was precarious, if not desperate […]. Besides the numerous machine guns [the enemy] seemed to possess, [they] also had a dug-in self-propelled gun not fifty yards from 13 platoon’s position.” (Cassidy P. 281). The fact that a Corporal was in command of 2x platoons speaks volumes to how high the casualty rate had been on this day.
All three companies were now pinned down in a vulnerable position and organised a defensive perimeter to hopefully get through the night until further assistance could be provided. “The battalion outlook was not a bright one on the night of the 7th. Every bit of manpower available had already been committed […]. Casualties had been enormously heavy, considering the light strength at the outset of the battle. Literally, there did not seem to be anything left to punch with.” (Cassidy P. 282)
The Regiment's War Diary had the following to say about 'C' Company's attack and the conditions they were facing:
At 1800 hrs “C” Coy arrived at “B” Coy position with the intention of passing through. Their casualties, mostly from small arm fire were also over 50% and the Commanding Officer ordered that they firm up with “B” Coy in the buildings at MR 102360.
“A” and “B” Coys, though firm enough, were never more than 100 yards away from the enemy who were similarly set up in reinforced houses. “B” Coy in attempting to expand their holdings, made two unsuccessful attempts to capture the adjoining buildings, on the first occasion with one officer and 7 other ranks casualties and the second time with 7 more casualties. The Commanding Officer then ordered that no more attempts be made for the present.
During the night casualties were evacuated under the difficult conditions of bad ground and heavy fire. Food and ammunition were delivered to the forward companies and several more tanks fought their way forward to provide support.
During all this action most of our casualties were caused by aimed small arm fire from the reinforced houses in which it was impossible to neutralize the fire even with the guns of our tanks. On one occasion after a tank had fired three rounds of rapid HE through the window of a building, a German soldier stuck his head out of a window and thumbed his nose at the oncoming infantry. Resistance was fanatical and a very small number of prisoners were taken. The percentage of killed to wounded was higher than the battalion has ever experienced. This was due to the aimed small arm fire of the enemy and the absolute lack of cover in the open ground over which the advance took place. The artillery concentrations, although magnificently placed, only served to the boch’s head down momentarily and then he would come up to murder our men in the final assault.
Veen - 8 Mar 1945
The next morning, 'A' company, now numbering 40 after receiving reinforcements, commenced the attack on their objective again and were again stymied by stiff German resistance. “Nineteen casualties out of forty in the space of less than two hours, and in an area of action of only a few yards dimensions! It is little wonder that the very mention of the word ‘Veen’ can still bring a shudder to some men.” (Cassidy P. 283)
On the left, 'B' and 'C' companies were locked in a duel of gun-fire with the obstinate enemy in the outpost strong-point west of Veen. “The day had passed in a miserable duel of gunfire, during which no head could safely appear out-of-doors or above ground, and in which no added strength arrived to enable the advance to continue. It was simply a question of ‘snipe and be sniped at’” (Cassidy p. 283)
From the War Diary:
Vicinity VEEN, 8 MAR. 1945
1. Weather: Rain in AM. Drizzle at odd times during the day. Visibility poor.
2. All during this day our force was completely pinned down by anti-tank fire, snipers and shelling. Jerry sniping was uncanny and every time a head showed it was almost certain to be picked off. Our tanks, due to bad ground found manoevour almost impossible and were forced to remain strictly on the defensive. However, at no time did the position seem insecure defensively. Company strengths at this time were “A Coy 24; “B” Coy 35; “C” Coy 33. Officer casualties were Lts Fraser and Mowry, Killed, and Lts Brassard, Hawkings and Heywood, wounded.
3. During the day, evacuation of casualties by jeep ambulance was impossible as Jerry completely ignored the existence of the red crosses on the vehicles. No less than three ambulance drivers were hit by enemy snipers before evacuation was discontinued until after dark. [...]
5. All the shelling in this area appeared to be the result of direct observation from the high ground to the North East. At every sign of vehicle movement anywhere throughout the area, Jerry immediately threw the book at us.
6. One of our command post warriors was heard to remark that he was several times allowed sufficient leeway to go out for a crap, but he was never given time enough to wipe himself.
Veen - 9 March 1945
Overnight, the Germans began to slip away, no doubt concerned about being outflanked by the L&Ws moving up from the south, as well as the rest of the 1st Cdn Army and 9th US army. There was still some resistance however as the war diary notes:
Vicinity VEEN, 9 MAR. 1945
1. Weather: Cloudy in the AM. Windy with sun out in the afternoon. Visibility good.
2. During the early morning hours, Lt FR Caron was ordered to take command of “A” Coy and to take forward 30 reinforcements who had just arrived in the theatre and none of whom had ever seen battle before.
3. On the left a plan was devised to get Crocodiles [flame throwers] into the area in an attempt to burn Jerry out. Although six crocs started for the area, only one managed to get through and that one had to be smoked in after daylight.
4. At 0830 hrs an attack with the flame thrower and infantry moved onto the buildings at MR 013358 – Results, 12 prisoners of war and 12 civilians taken. The attack then moved towards another house at MR 105357. Here a white flag was draped out of a top window but it was ignored by the attackers. Some Jerries escaped out the back door under cover of smoke but later investigation proved that the attack had netted 15 Germans “well and truly fried”. This was the end for Jerry and at 1000 hrs “A” and “C” Coys pushed forward into VEEN against no resistance. [...] 12 prisoners of war were immediately put to work gathering up both our dead and their own.
6. Command post was then established in the house where the 12 civilians were found, and although fraternization was at a minimum, two females were allowed in the building to do the chores and Private Red Gugeon, COs batman, saw to it that they were the best looking of the lot. This house had been booby trapped and Sjt Webb I L, of “B” Coy was killed when pulling a blanket off a bed. Two SBs were wounded when removing sheets for bandages. After this the owner of the house was brought in and threatened with being shot unless he divulged where other booby traps might be located. He apparently had no idea of exact locations, but several rooms where he thought they might exist were locked up and placed out of bounds. [...]
9. Our total casualties from 27 Feb to 9 Mar were 288 other ranks and 13 officers.
Major Cassidy described the entry to Veen in 'Warpath':
“The dreaded strongpoint […] folded without any resistance. The enemy had faded right out during the night. As the troops scoured the area and moved in on Veen, they had the opportunity to appraise the German defences. These innocent-looking brick farmhouses were in reality true fortresses, buttressed within by concrete and by extra-thick brick walls. Every window was a gun position or observation post, and cellars, tunnels and obstacles of all sorts allowed the defenders good comfort, safety and secure communications. The fact that these troops were of the Parachute Lehr Regiment would indicate another reason for the stubbornness of the defence here. At any rate, the Algonquin Regiment, what was left of it, was in Veen.” (Cassidy P. 284)
In 'Cinderella Army', Terry Copp
Copp quotes one of the CMHQ reports that describes the attack on Veen as “…a savage slugging match in which every yard of ground became precious in the face of murderous small arms fire, continuous shelling and mortaring…”
I found it very intriguing to note the lack of any pity for the defeated Germans noted in both Cassidy's 'Warpath' and the official War Diary. The widespread use of flamethrowers, very effective in clearing out stongpoints, was simply considered normal business. Various mopping up operations would take place over the next couple of days and it is fair to say that the use of flamethrowers continued and that there was clearly no pity left in the men of 4th Canadian Armoured Division. Small forces using flamethrowers continued to clear out small wooden pockets surrounding the villages and buildings in the towns. Fires burned throughout the area, casting an eerie glow against the smoke and clouds throughout the night. One factory that had been left to burn all night after the Canadians set it alight surrendered that morning, producing around 100 prisoners, but only after the Canadians had been forced to hear the moaning and wailing of the injured inside as the flames consumed them.“…most of the buildings were left in flames. They burned luridly all that night as the two spent forces faced on another in an eerie atmosphere of red-splashed blackness, crackling timbers, with the moans of the wounded and burned heard fitfully against the background of the booming guns overhead. The last stand of the German Army west of the Rhine was fading out, but appropriately, with all the stage trimmings of a Wagnerian Opera.” (Cassidy P. 287)
Terry Copp does a very good job in highlighting the importance of the Battle for the Rhineland and the crass manner in which it has been largely forgotten by history. “Every February newspapers around the world mark the anniversary of the bombing of Dresden on 13 February 1945. In almost every article reference is made to the ‘fact’ that the raid was especially cruel as the war was almost over. Yet Dresden was bombed on the eve Moyland Wood, four long, bloody weeks before the last surviving German soldier retreated to the east bank of the Rhine. There are no newspaper stories about the agony of the Rhineland battle. Our collective memory of the war has yet to find room for stories of the endurance and survival of ordinary soldiers.” (Copp p. 245)
Operation BLOCKBUSTER was over, but it had been an enormously costly affair. Between 27th of February and 10th of March, The Algonquin Regiment lost 12 officers and 281 other ranks. The attack on Veen alone cost 4th Division a full 300 casualties.
One of those casualties was my Great Uncle, Corporal Preston Duncan Campbell of 'C'Company, The Algonquin Regiment.